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Abstract
This study uses the 2010 implementation of IRS Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Position)
to examine the impact of additional tax return reporting on financial statement tax disclosure
quality. Using a hand-collected sample, I find that firms reduce the quality of their Financial
Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) disclosures for Accounting for
Uncertainty in Income Taxes in response to increased proprietary costs of disclosure following the
adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. Standard setters intended FIN 48 disclosures to benefit investors.
Contrary to this intended outcome, I find that as tax return reporting increases, firms reduce
discretionary FIN 48 disclosures, making public tax disclosures more opaque and less useful to
tax authorities and other stakeholders. Thus, an unintended consequence of increased tax return
reporting is lower financial statement tax disclosure quality that undermines standard setters’ goals
of transparency, relevance, and comparability in financial reporting of income taxes.
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I. Introduction
My study examines how firms respond to mandatory increases in disclosure to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). Specifically, I examine how increased private tax return reporting via IRS
Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Position) impacts the public financial statement tax disclosure
quality of reserves for uncertain tax positions. Information on Schedule UTP paired with high
quality financial statement disclosures required under Financial Accounting Standards Board
Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) potentially increases firms’ proprietary costs because increased
disclosure reduces the firms’ ability to effectively negotiate with the IRS regarding their uncertain
tax positions. In what is likely an unintended consequence of the IRS mandate to increase tax
return reporting, firms could seek to minimize proprietary costs by decreasing their FIN 48
disclosure quality in order to limit the public information available to the IRS about their uncertain
tax positions.1 This is important because investors are generally unable to access corporate tax
returns to obtain information for evaluating a firm’s tax strategies2 and FIN 48 disclosure is the
primary source of information for investors to assess a firm’s uncertain tax positions.
In 2010, the IRS implemented Schedule UTP to increase the efficiency of corporate
taxpayer audits (Shulman 2010). Due to the nature of Schedule UTP reporting, its efficacy at
increasing IRS audit efficiency should depend on its interaction and overlap with public
disclosures of uncertain tax positions, and with the quality of those disclosures. For example,
Schedule UTP requires a firm to disclose a concise narrative description, but not the magnitude,
of each federal uncertain tax position included in its FIN 48 reserves. As a result, FIN 48 reserves

1

For this study, I use the terms FIN 48 disclosure and public tax disclosure to refer to the financial statement
disclosures required by FIN 48. IRS Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Position) tax return disclosures are distinct.
Uncertain tax positions reported on IRS Schedule UTP are descriptions of the underlying federal uncertain tax
positions for which the firm is reserving in their FIN 48 reserve liability and is including in their federal tax return.
To avoid confusion, I refer to Schedule UTP disclosures as tax return reporting or private tax disclosure.
2
Debtholders may have access to corporate tax returns as a part of the due diligence process.
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and related disclosures are the only way the IRS can ascertain the economic magnitude of these
uncertain tax positions. 3 In fact, the IRS instructs its examiners to carefully review and analyze
financial statement tax disclosures as a part of the audit planning process.4 This is important
because the IRS faces constrained resources, budget, and staffing (Nessa, Schwab, Stomberg, and
Towery 2016; Marr, Friedman, and DeBot 2015).
Evidence supports the assertion that the financial statement disclosure for uncertain tax
positions is important for the IRS and that this importance increased subsequent to the
promulgation of Schedule UTP. Specifically, Bozanic, Hoopes, Thornock, and Williams (2017)
find that the IRS more than tripled its downloads of 10-K annual financial statement filings
following the 2007 adoption of FIN 48. Furthermore, Bozanic et al. (2017) find a more than fifty
percent increase in the number of 2010 10-K filings that the IRS downloaded in 2011 following
the 2010 adoption of Schedule UTP.
Consistent with firms perceiving Schedule UTP to increase proprietary costs, my results
show that FIN 48 disclosure quality declines following the 2010 adoption of IRS Schedule UTP.
I find that firms maintain their compliance with the mandatory components of FIN 48 disclosure
while decreasing discretionary disclosures. Additionally, I find that while firms continue to
comply with mandatory components of FIN 48 disclosure, firms change how they comply. For
example, firms are less likely to include numerical estimates in their mandatory discussions of
expected changes to FIN 48 reserve balances.5

Any incremental information gained from FIN 48 disclosures is important to the IRS because under the IRS’s
Modified Policy of Restraint issued in conjunction with the implementation of IRS Schedule UTP, the IRS is not
allowed to request documents privileged under attorney-client privilege, tax advice privilege, or the work product
doctrine – see https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/uncertain-tax-positions-modified-policy-of-restraint.
4
See http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/FIN-48-Implications---LB&I-Field-Examiners'-Guide.
5
A change to the content of an annual footnote disclosure, absent a change to the governing accounting standard, is
uncommon. A conversation with a former director for SEC reporting at a public company confirms that it is
standard practice to roll forward disclosures from one year to the next and only update the relevant numbers. Thus,
the changes to the content of discretionary disclosures that I document are unlikely to be spurious. My results
3
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My results suggest that regulators should consider how firm discretion impacts disclosure
quality and how firm discretion allows firms to comply with the letter of the law without fulfilling
the spirit of the law. This consideration is relevant as the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF)
proposes allowing firms the discretion to determine the materiality threshold for reporting FIN 48
reserves and removing the requirement for a tabular reconciliation of FIN 48 reserves. A recent
conversation with FAF staff reveals that they are not concerned that information will be lost if
more firm discretion is allowed regarding how firms comply with FIN 48 disclosure requirements.
The FAF anticipates that if given more discretion, firms will focus on providing more information
on their most material transactions. My results suggest that this prediction is unlikely. My findings
show that firms exercise discretion to reduce FIN 48 disclosure quality. My results are consistent
with the rise in SEC comment letters released concerning poor FIN 48 disclosure quality. Of the
422 comment letters issued through the first 9 months of 2015, 45 related to FIN 48 reserves.
Consistent with my findings, PwC summarizes that “disclosures lack the clarity necessary to
provide financial statement users with an understanding of a change in the measurement of
unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) that have already occurred or could potentially occur in the near
term (PwC 2015).”
With the exception of the Robinson and Schmidt (2013) study that examines FIN 48
disclosure quality following the initial period of FIN 48 adoption, prior FIN 48 disclosure studies
only report on changes to FIN 48 reserve balances (Abernathy et al. 2013; Towery 2017), only
focus on one component of the FIN 48 disclosure (Abernathy, Beyer, and Rapley 2017; Dunbar,
Omer, and Schultz 2010; Blouin, Gleason, Mills, and Sikes 2007), or measure the volume of the
tax footnote in its entirety, while relying on indirect proxies to assess the content of the FIN 48

support that firms respond to the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP and the mandate for the disclosure of additional
private tax information to the IRS by reducing the quality of FIN 48 public tax disclosures.
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disclosure (Bozanic et al. 2017). In contrast, my study using a hand-collected sample allows for a
comprehensive examination of FIN 48 disclosure quality.

Rather than relying on indirect

measures, my hand-collected sample allows me to directly measure FIN 48 disclosure quality by
capturing compliance with each of the six mandatory components of FIN 48 as well as four
components of discretionary disclosure.
My paper provides insight that helps to explain potentially conflicting results in the prior
literature examining the impact of IRS Schedule UTP on FIN 48 reporting and disclosure. Towery
(2017) finds that firms reduce their FIN 48 reserves without reducing their underlying tax positions
in their tax returns in response to IRS Schedule UTP. Towery (2017) also finds that firms facing
higher costs of Schedule UTP disclosure provide less informative concise descriptions in private
disclosures to the IRS. Consistent with Towery (2017) findings, additional analysis reveals that
firms in my sample that have the largest reductions to FIN48 reserves are more likely to reduce
discretionary FIN 48 disclosure quality following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. In contrast,
Bozanic et al. (2017) finds that firms increase their volume of public financial statement tax
disclosure following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. However, Bozanic et al. (2017) relies on
measures of the number of sentences and number of numerical figures in the entire tax footnote to
examine how firms respond to increased IRS attention surrounding IRS Schedule UTP. In
additional analysis, I find that following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP, firms subject to IRS
Schedule UTP are more likely to disclose additional information about previously settled prioryear tax positions than those firms not subject to IRS Schedule UTP. Firms are more likely to
include an additional prior year of data in their tabular reconciliation of FIN 48 reserves and to
include more discussion of the resolutions of prior years’ FIN 48 reserves rather than the details

4

of the nature of the current year’s FIN 48 reserves. This result is consistent with Bozanic et al.’s
(2017) finding of more voluminous disclosure and my finding of decreased disclosure quality.6
Bozanic et al. (2017) also examines the entire tax footnote, thereby introducing a volume
of information that may be unrelated to FIN 48 tax reserves. Bozanic et al. (2017) uses Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to gain a level of comfort that the additional discussion likely relates
to FIN 48 topics. However, my results suggest that while firms increase the volume of narrative
disclosure surrounding prior years’ FIN 48 reserve balances, firms reduce disclosure quality
surrounding current or active FIN 48 reserves which would be of most interest to tax authorities.
Because I directly measure whether and how the information content of each firm’s FIN 48
disclosure changes in response to IRS Schedule UTP, my results reconcile the seemingly
incongruent findings of Towery (2017) and Bozanic et al. (2017).
Standard setters designed FIN 48 disclosure requirements for the benefit of investors
(Blouin and Robinson 2014). However, there are unintended consequences for investors if FIN
48 disclosures become increasingly opaque and/or less complete, diminishing the disclosure’s
informative value. As such, it is an important research question to address whether additional tax
return disclosure requirements impact the quality of financial statement tax disclosures. Results
of my primary tests using a balanced panel of firms that filed IRS Schedule UTP show that firms
reduce FIN 48 disclosure quality following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. This finding
supports the assertion that firms respond to increased tax return reporting that mandates increased
private disclosure to tax authorities by reducing the quality of public tax disclosures to prevent tax
authorities from gaining incremental information.

See Appendix C for an example of a firm providing additional disclosure of prior years’ FIN 48 reserves following
the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. The example shown from Northrop Grumman Corporation shows that the entire
increase in word count related to FIN 48 disclosure is due to the inclusion of the discussion of the additional prior year
that is included in the tabular reconciliation.
6
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My study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, my hand-collected
data set allows me to answer the call in Blouin and Robinson (2011) to provide evidence regarding
the extent of disclosure variation or the lack of variation after the initial 2007 adoption of FIN 48.
Next, I extend the literature on the consequences of changes in tax return reporting requirements
(Towery 2017; Abernathy et al. 2013; Donohoe and McGill 2011; Frischmann, Shevlin, and
Wilson 2008). As tax authorities acquire new sources of tax data, it is important that there is
recognition of the potential unintended consequences of these tax enforcement efforts. Third, I
extend the robust literature that examines how tax reporting affects financial reporting choices
(Gramlich 1991; Boynton, Dobbins, and Plesko 1992; Manzon 1992; Dhaliwal and Wang 1992;
Wang 1994; Guenther, Maydew, and Nutter 1997; Keating and Zimmerman 1999; Calegari 2000;
Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin 2008).
My findings indicate that it is necessary to consider that tax return reporting, in addition to
affecting financial reporting decisions, is also associated with a contemporaneous change in the
disclosure quality related to the affected financial reporting items. In addition to being concerned
with how FIN 48 tax reserve balances change, my study highlights that stakeholders should also
be concerned with changes in the quality of the information accompanying FIN 48 tax reserve
balances in response to increased tax reporting. Lastly, my findings are relevant to policymakers,
as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) considers updates to FIN 48 requirements
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) considers international standards for tax
contingency reporting. My findings suggest that it is necessary to consider how firm discretion
has the potential to reduce tax disclosure quality and thwart the goals of relevance, transparency,
and comparability in financial reporting of income taxes.

6

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section provides background
information and literature review. Section III presents the hypothesis development. Section IV
discusses the data and research design. I present the primary results in Section V. Section VI
reports additional analyses, and Section VII concludes.
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II. Background and Literature Review
Financial Statement Tax Disclosure - FIN 48
FIN 48 governs Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes. Effective for fiscal years
beginning after December 15, 2006, FIN 48 provides guidance on accounting for tax contingencies
and requires the mandatory disclosure of uncertain tax positions to promote consistency and
comparability across firms.7 Under the previous SFAS (109) reporting regime, in the pre-FIN 48
era, there was variation in how firms defined materiality, and few firms reported their reserves for
uncertain tax positions (Blouin and Robinson 2011). Gleason and Mills (2002) find that only 27
percent of observations in their pre-FIN 48 sample contain any disclosure of a tax reserve.
FIN 48 requires that firms report tax reserve balances, termed unrecognized tax benefit
(UTB) balances, in addition to disclosing other informational components. UTBs are a measure
of the firm’s liability for uncertain tax positions, capturing the amount of tax due on positions that
fail to meet the more-likely-than-not threshold (as defined in FIN 48).8 This assessment assumes
that positions are audited by the appropriate taxing authority possessing all knowledge of all
relevant information (FASB 2006). In addition to the reconciliation of beginning and ending FIN
48 reserves, the other components of FIN 48 disclosure can include a rich discussion of information
that identifies the nature of specific uncertain tax positions. Examples of uncertain tax positions
for which an unrecognized tax benefit might be accrued are the decision to not file a state tax return

When a corporation ﬁles its tax return, it often pays less tax than the IRS and the courts might require if various
positions related to exclusions, deductions, credits, and valuations were challenged. In its ﬁnancial statements, the
corporation must estimate how much tax expense and tax liability to record, taking into account the uncertainty of the
tax beneﬁt related to these positions. The reserve represents the ﬁrm’s estimate of additional tax expense the ﬁrm
expects to owe after the audit and the resolution of any litigation. The reserve reduces its current period income and/or
net assets. As a result, some of the uncertain beneﬁt claimed on the current year tax return is not recognized in the
ﬁnancial statements (Mills, Robinson, and Sansing 2010).
8
I use the terms FIN 48 reserves, UTB reserves, UTB balances to refer to the liability accrued for a firm’s uncertain
tax positions that fail to meet the FIN 48 standard of more-likely-than-not to be sustained in the event of an audit.
7
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due to uncertainty surrounding nexus, transfer pricing between jurisdictions, and classifying a
position as tax exempt.
The liability for uncertain tax positions included in FIN 48 disclosures is an important
account. The average FIN 48 reserve for firms in my sample is $183 million and the largest tax
reserve is $7.8 billion. Given the magnitude of FIN 48 reserves, firms are likely concerned with
sustaining these tax positions and protecting them from scrutiny and potential reversal by tax
authorities. The IRS, other tax authorities, investors and other stakeholders are likely interested in
the tax positions for which firms record FIN 48 reserves and the disclosures about those reserves.
Under the FIN 48 regime, the mandatory nature of the tax reserve liability disclosures
creates a benchmark for measuring firm disclosure choices.

Deviations from the explicit

requirements of FIN 48 create variation in the disclosure quality and information content of FIN
48 disclosures across firms. Robinson and Schmidt (2013) develop disclosure completeness and
clarity measures to capture this variation. The disclosure completeness measure is based on the
mandatory disclosure of eight items in Paragraphs 20 and 21 of FIN 48.
Prior research documents that firms exercise wide discretion and significant variation with
regard to FIN 48 disclosure. This variation allows for the measurement of lack of compliance with
individual components of FIN 48 disclosure. For example, only seventeen percent of my sample
comply with all six mandatory components of my FIN 48 compliance measure, COMPLETE.9 I
also measure four discretionary components of FIN 48 disclosure. The CLARITY measure captures
how inconsistencies in FIN 48 disclosure reporting create a lack of transparency and
comparability. FIN 48 leaves room for interpretation for how uncertain tax positions are disclosed,

9

Based on the Robinson and Schmidt (2013) compliance measure, COMPLETE measures the six mandatory
components of FIN 48 disclosure that are required in periods subsequent to the initial adoption period and for which
firms demonstrate variation in compliance.
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as well as whether and how additional information is included in the disclosure (Beyer, Cohen,
Lys, and Walther 2010; Blouin and Robinson 2011). A component of the CLARITY measure is
whether firms disclose if the UTB reported includes or excludes interest and penalties. In their
sample, Blouin, Gleason, Mills, and Sikes (2007) find that the aggregate UTB could range from
$70 to $78 billion, depending upon the assumption as to whether the disclosed UTB reserve
contains interest. Blouin and Robinson (2011) conclude their submission to the FAF’s PostImplementation Review of FIN 48 by stating, “If disclosure practices are too varied, then strides
in increasing the comparability of UTB balances may yield little benefit to shareholders.”
A recent FASB exposure draft reports that FIN 48 users do not use disclosures about
unrecognized tax benefits for modeling purposes, but they do use the disclosures to assess how
aggressive an entity is with its tax positions (FASB 2016). This finding is inconsistent with the
conclusions reported in the FAF’s 2012 FIN 48 Post-Implementation Review, which states that
investors use the information included in FIN 48 disclosures to predict income tax cash flows and
to assess how aggressive management are in their income tax strategies (FAF 2012). This change
in how investors use FIN 48 suggests that since the adoption of FIN 48, there has been a change
in investor’s ability to gain useful information from FIN 48 disclosures. This is consistent with
recent SEC Comment letters that find that FIN 48 disclosures lack sufficient clarity to be useful to
financial statement users (PwC 2015). Thus, there are implications for financial statement users
if increased tax return reporting is also associated with reduced disclosure quality that diminishes
the relevance, transparency and comparability and ultimately the usefulness of public tax
disclosures that standard setters intended with the passage of FIN 48.

10

Tax Return Reporting - IRS Schedule UTP
The final version of Schedule UTP released on September 24, 2010, requires firms with
assets of $100 million or greater to disclose a narrative description, but not the amount, for each
federal uncertain tax position for which they have a FIN 48 reserve in their financial statements.
Firms are required to separately disclose federal uncertain tax positions for the current year and
accumulated prior year positions that are still pending. There is a transition rule whereby a firm
is not required to report a tax position taken in a tax year beginning before January 1, 2010, even
if a reserve is recorded with respect to that tax position in audited financial statements issued in
2010 or later. Also, at adoption Schedule UTP included a planned roll-out of Schedule UTP to
firms with assets of $50 million and $10 million in assets in 2012 and 2014, respectively. Thus,
the implications of increased Schedule UTP tax reporting are relevant for small firms that become
subject to Schedule UTP in subsequent years.
IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman introduced Schedule UTP in a January 2010 speech
made to the New York State Bar Association Taxation Section. In practice, prior to Schedule
UTP, the aggregated nature of the reserve balance prevented federal, state, and foreign tax
authorities from determining whether the reserves related to tax positions claimed in their
respective jurisdictions (Towery 2017). In his remarks, Commissioner Schulman indicated a
desire to increase efficiency in the audit process and to reduce the amount of time the IRS spent
searching for taxpayer issues (Shulman 2010). Practitioners and professional organizations tried
to pressure the IRS to abandon the initiative (Towery 2017). Robert Mathers, a member of the
AICPA Tax Practice Responsibilities Committee, referred to the Schedule UTP as a “road map to
potential audit issues” (Mathers and Kmiecik 2015). Prior research supports the notion that
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investors believe Schedule UTP provides the ‘‘road map’’ to the IRS that FIN 48 on its own did
not (Abernathy, Davenport, and Rapley 2013).
Regulatory Interaction
Regulatory interaction is the combination of requirements to publicly disclose some
information and privately disclose other information to regulators (Bozanic, Hoopes, Thornock,
and Williams 2017). Schedule UTP enables the IRS to link federal uncertain tax positions
reported on the Schedule UTP to information included in a firm’s public FIN 48 disclosures.
Schedule UTP, along with any incremental information garnered from FIN 48 disclosures can
help the IRS to refine and target its audit process and procedures. In the IRS’s Modified Policy
of Restraint issued in conjunction with the implementation of IRS Schedule UTP, the IRS is not
allowed to request documents privileged under attorney-client privilege, tax advice privilege, or
the work product doctrine. Thus, the ability to link information from public tax disclosures to
private tax reporting is a likely “road map” mechanism.
There are a number of ways that the IRS can link Schedule UTP to information in FIN 48
disclosures. For example, if a firm lists a new uncertain tax position on Schedule UTP, this item
can be traced to the firm’s explanation of the dollar amount of current year UTB changes. 10
Furthermore, Schedule UTP requires firms to indicate if a position causes a permanent and/or
temporary tax difference. If a firm chooses to disclose the portion of the UTB balance that
impacts the effective tax rate or provides an explanation for the portion of their UTB balance that
does not affect their effective tax rate, this scenario again provides incremental information to
the IRS that could allow the IRS to better ascertain the dollar magnitude of reserves for specific
10

There may be multiple jurisdictions included in the total current year additions included in the FIN 48
reconciliation. However, if a firm provides an explanation that attributes all or a portion of the current year addition
to a specific jurisdiction, this better informs the IRS of the dollar amount of the current year portion of the FIN 48
reserve that may be related to federal uncertain tax positions included on IRS Schedule UTP.
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UTPs.11 If a firm chooses to disclose its accrued interest and penalties related to UTB balances
separately, revealing large accrued penalties, this documentation signals that the firm has
relatively aggressive uncertain tax positions that the firm deems would result in penalties in
addition to interest were those positions to be audited by tax authorities (Robinson and Schmidt
2013). If a firm chooses to disclose that it expects to reduce its UTB balance in the next year due
to expiration, this narrative allows the IRS to trace the UTB reserve amounts to those federal
uncertain tax positions that are set to expire in the next year and gain a sense of potential
magnitude relating to federal positions. The same is true if a firm discloses a UTB amount that it
expects to settle within the year. Thus, Schedule UTP may increase the proprietary costs of
firms publicly disclosing incremental information in financial statement FIN 48 disclosures.
Prior research finds that firms reduced reported FIN 48 reserve balances in response to the
adoption of IRS Schedule UTP in 2010 (Abernathy et al. 2013; Towery 2017). Using confidential
IRS data, Towery (2017) finds that after the imposition of Schedule UTP tax reporting
requirements, firms report lower FIN 48 tax reserves for financial reporting purposes, but do not
claim fewer income tax benefits on their federal tax returns. This finding suggests that some firms
changed their financial reporting of UTB reserves for uncertain tax positions to avoid Schedule
UTP reporting requirements without changing the underlying positions. Towery (2017) interprets
the result as an unintended consequence of increased tax return reporting that firms permanently
reduce their financial reporting of FIN 48 reserve balances. As such, it is possible that in addition
to reducing UTB balances reported, firms also change the information disclosed about remaining
UTB balances. In other words, the FIN 48 reserve balance is one lever that a firm can maneuver
11

The FIN 48 explanation of UTB impact to the effective tax rate is different than UTB amounts that may be included
in the tax rate reconciliation also presented in the 10-K. The rate reconciliation includes the amount of UTB that
impacts the current year’s effective tax rate. The FIN48 disclosure addresses the portion of the UTB ending balance
that may impact effective tax rates in future years.
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in response to IRS Schedule UTP. FIN 48 disclosure quality is another, potentially less costly,
level that firms can manipulate in response to IRS Schedule UTP. Less costly, because auditors
may be less likely to question a FIN 48 disclosure change than they would be to question a change
to the actual FIN 48 reserve. Information that a firm discloses in its FIN 48 financial statement
disclosure has the potential to allow the IRS to infer more accurate estimates of the magnitude of
uncertain tax positions listed on Schedule UTP. This conglomeration of public and private data is
a proprietary cost that potentially impacts the ability of firms to negotiate with the IRS during the
audit process. Thus, higher quality FIN 48 disclosures can effectively reduce noise for the IRS by
increasing the disaggregating signals (Banker and Datar 1989). Disaggregating signals being that
the more detailed and precise FIN 48 disclosures are, the less noise the IRS has to decipher in order
to gain information that complements private disclosures in IRS Schedule UTP. Higher quality
FIN 48 financial statement disclosures have the potential to aid the IRS in levying more accurate
assessments and more efficiently allocating constrained audit resources.

14

III. Hypothesis Development
Disclosure theory posits that, provided certain frictions are not present, managers will
disclose all material information in a timely and high-quality manner (Grossman and Hart 1980).
In the disclosure setting, frictions are associated with costs managers will incur from high-quality
timely disclosures. There is an inherent information asymmetry between the IRS and firms, which
can affect a firms’ willingness to publicly disclose tax information. There was initial concern that
FIN 48 disclosures would act as a “roadmap” for the IRS, pointing the IRS towards plausibly
contestable tax issues (Leone 2007). The IRS introduced Schedule UTP in 2010, confirming the
IRS’s interest in and focus on uncertain tax positions to increase the efficiency and effectiveness
of corporate tax audits (Harvey 2010). It is possible that IRS Schedule UTP heightens proprietary
costs because of the increased risk of disclosing incremental or complementary information that
the IRS is now able to trace to private tax return disclosures. If managers believe that IRS Schedule
UTP increases proprietary costs, they may react by reducing FIN 48 financial statement disclosure
quality. This reaction would be with consistent Wagenhofer (1990) and Verrecchia (1983) that
suggest managerial concerns of revealing proprietary information could limit full disclosure.
Consequently, it is possible then that increased tax return reporting leads to reduced financial
statement tax disclosure quality.

The firm’s motivation could also be to provide as little

information as possible to tax authorities or a desire to maintain the continuity of its usual
disclosure pattern (Field, Lowry, and Shu 2005).
However, given the extent of the IRS’s private information, new public information
provided in the financial statements may not be very useful for tax enforcement (FASB 2006). It
is possible that once the IRS requires more private disclosure, the proprietary cost of information
disclosure to shareholders is reduced, and firms publicly disclose more. If this is the case, in the
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presence of lower proprietary costs, firms may respond by increasing FIN 48 disclosure quality.
This result is consistent with Bozanic et al. (2017) findings of increased volume of tax disclosure
following the 2010 adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. Firms may desire to be as transparent as
possible to investors regarding their uncertain tax positions, while also minimizing the probability
that revealed tax information is used against them by the tax authority (Mills et al. 2010). Thus,
increased private tax disclosure to the IRS may reduce the cost of increased public tax disclosure.
Bozanic et al. (2017) assert that tax-related proprietary costs decrease as a result of the IRS’s
increased private disclosure requirements (Verrecchia 2001; Dye 2001).
In addition to facing proprietary costs, firms face other disclosure costs. Prior research
shows that lower quality disclosures subject firms to increased cost of equity capital and lower
firm valuations (Francis, Nanda, and Olsson 2008; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007; Hope,
Ma, and Thomas 2013; Akamah, Hope, and Thomas 2014; Botosan 1997; Chung, Judge, and Li
2015). Theoretical models propose that managers disclose more information than required by
market regulations to reduce information asymmetry among their investors (Diamond 1985;
Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Survey evidence suggests that managers provide voluntary
disclosure to reduce risk (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay
(2014) finds that firms with greater tax complexity increase disclosure to reduce information
asymmetry. It is possible then that firms maintain or improve their FIN 48 disclosure quality after
Schedule UTP to reduce information asymmetry with investors. Firms may disclose more
information increasing the quality of their tax disclosures to signal the legitimacy of those
uncertain tax positions and reduce uncertainty for investors. Analytical models predict that
taxpayers will claim fewer weak tax positions once the tax authority observes more information
about the strength of a tax position (Mills et al. 2010). This finding suggests that subsequent to
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the initial adoption period of FIN 48, the remaining uncertain tax positions are the most strongly
supported and the least likely to be overturned. Thus, the introduction of Schedule UTP may
motivate increased FIN 48 disclosure quality.
Based on the above theory and prior research, firms may choose to increase or decrease
FIN 48 disclosure in response to IRS Schedule UTP. Therefore, I do not predict a direction and I
state my hypothesis in the null form:
H1: Firms do not change their FIN 48 disclosure quality in response to IRS Schedule UTP.
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IV. Data and Research Design
Sample Selection and Variable Descriptions
I examine a hand-collected sample of FIN 48 footnote disclosures for calendar year-end
firms in the Compustat S&P 1500 Super Composite Index for 2009 and 2010. The introduction
and final implementation of Schedule UTP within calendar-year 2010 provides a clean cutoff to
examine the impact of increased tax return reporting that requires increased private tax disclosure.
In 2010, non-calendar year-end firms had more time to respond to Schedule UTP filing
requirements than calendar year-end firms. While a non-calendar year-end firm might choose not
to enter a planned transaction upon the September 2010 release of the final Schedule UTP, a
calendar year-end firm might have already entered the transaction. Towery (2017) notes that due
to proximity to year end of the implementation of Schedule UTP, calendar-year firms likely did
not have time to unwind their uncertain tax positions related to FIN 48 reserves reported. Thus, I
limit the sample to calendar year-end firms to hold constant the amount of time sample firms had
to respond to Schedule UTP. I exclude firms that disclose a zero or non-material UTB balance
and do not report a tabular UTB reconciliation in 2009 or 2010. Table 2 provides a summary of
sample selection for my balanced panel of firms.
Following Robinson and Schmidt (2013), I construct a two-part disclosure quality score
for each ﬁrm in the sample, COMPLETE and CLARITY. COMPLETE measures compliance with
the FIN 48 disclosure guidelines by capturing the presence or absence of each mandatory
disclosure as presented in the Appendix A. The eight criteria are: 1. Firms must disclose a tabular
reconciliation of the UTB balance that categorizes changes during period. 2. Firms must describe
changes to the UTB reserve balance during the year. 3. Firms must separately disclose the amount
of the UTB that, if recognized, would affect the effective tax rate (ETR). 4. The disclosure must
contain the amounts of any accrued interest and penalties related to the UTB. 5. Firms must
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stipulate where they report interest and penalties in the income statement. 6. The disclosure must
include a discussion of open tax years in major jurisdictions. 7. Firms must make a forwardlooking disclosure of expected changes to the UTB balance within the next twelve months. 8.
Firms must disclose the balance sheet adoption effect of retroactive application of FIN 48 (only
required in the year of adoption). Each component of the disclosure measures is described in detail
in Table 1. To account for FIN 48 compliance after the initial period of adoption, I exclude item
eight, the requirement for firms to disclose the initial balance sheet impact of FIN 48 adoption.
Although some firms continue to make this disclosure in subsequent years, it is only required in
the initial period of adoption of FIN 48. Also, I exclude the requirement to provide a tabular UTB
reconciliation. I use Python code to identify additional firms from the SEC Edgar database whose
10-K filings disclose FIN 48 balances that are not captured by Compustat. I also use ending UTB
balance as a control variable. Therefore, I require all firms in the sample to disclose a tabular UTB
reconciliation so that I have sufficient data for UTB control variables for all observations, those
identified via Compustat and those identified using Python code from the SEC Edgar database.
As all firms in the sample disclose a tabular UTB reconciliation in both years, there is no variation.
Thus, the COMPLETE score of mandatory disclosure ranges from 0 to 6.
The CLARITY measure is based on four additional elements of FIN 48 disclosure where
firm discretion is used in reporting. CLARITY ranges from 0 to 4 and captures discretionary
disclosure decisions by measuring the precision of the mandatory disclosures as indicated by the
presence or absence of important clarifying information needed to understand and interpret the
disclosure. The first clarity component is whether the firm includes a discussion or explanation of
the amount of the UTB that does not affect the effective tax rate (e.g., temporary differences,
goodwill, or other comprehensive income adjustments) that is included in the UTB reserve
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balance. The second clarity measure is whether the ﬁrm explicitly states whether the reported
UTB was gross or net of federal deductions for state tax benefits. The third clarity component is
whether the ﬁrm explicitly states whether the reported UTB included interest and penalties. The
fourth clarity measure is whether the ﬁrm reports interest and penalties separately.
To test H1, I estimate using a Poisson regression because my dependent variables are
nonnegative count variables.12 13
SCOREit = b0 + b1SchUTPit + b2CETRit + b3UTBit + b4SIZEit + b5PFTit + b6CAPINTit
+ b7LTDAit + b8MBit + b9BIG4it + b10TAXFEESit +b11DAYSFILEit
+ b12ANALYSTSit + b13WEAKYRSit +b14BODINSIDEit + b15BODLOCKSit
+ b16BODOTHERit + b17LITDUMit + b18REGDUMit + b19FOROPSit
+ b20BUS_SEGit + b21GEO_SEGit + f + eit
I define the dependent variable, SCORE, as either COMPLETE or CLARITY.
COMPLETE and CLARITY measure different aspects of the FIN 48 disclosure. COMPLETE
measures lack of compliance, while CLARITY measures the discretionary disclosure that
captures the voluntary inclusion of important clarifying information needed to understand and
interpret the disclosure. Following Robinson & Schmidt (2013), I include control variables
that capture ﬁrm-level characteristics that may affect ﬁrms’ disclosure choices. I include a
firm fixed effect to control for time invariant firm characteristics. The results are robust to
using an industry fixed effect. The model includes robust standard errors.
Proprietary costs of disclosing more information about uncertain tax positions result
from the possibility that the increased disclosure may weaken a firm’s competitive position

12

Robinson & Schmidt (2013) test using an ordered logit regression. Ordered logit regressions are most appropriate
when the dependent variable is an ordinal measure such as survey responses that measure from 1 to 10. A Poisson
regression is appropriate when the dependent variable is a count variable. In untabulated results, my results for my
main regressions are statistically similar when using an ordered logit.
13
I test the Poisson model for over dispersion using a negative binomial regression. I also use the Stata command
estat gof to test that the Poisson Model is appropriately specified. The model fits reasonably well because the
goodness-of-fit chi-squared test is not statistically significant.
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when negotiating with tax authorities, increase the probability of an audit occurring or
increase the effectiveness of an IRS audit. If the IRS does not find information in the FIN
48 disclosure useful, then the 2010 implementation of Schedule UTP may lower proprietary
costs associated with providing more information in the FIN 48 disclosure. As such, the
variable of interest is SchUTP, an indicator variable equal to one for 2010 firm-year
observations to capture a within firm analysis of whether firm disclosure changes
surrounding Schedule UTP adoption. The coefficient captures the average of firm-specific
differences in disclosure. I do not predict a direction for the association between disclosure
score and SchUTP. However, a negative SchUTP coefficient indicates that firms on average
have lower FIN 48 disclosure quality following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. A
positive SchUTP coefficient indicates that firms on average have higher quality FIN 48
disclosure post IRS Schedule UTP.
CETR is a measure of tax avoidance and is calculated as a three-year average cash
effective tax rate, measured as the sum of cash taxes paid from three lagged years divided by
the sum of total pretax income from three lagged years (Dyreng et al. 2008). CETR is
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.14 A positive and significant value of CETR implies
that firms that pay higher effective tax rates or engage in less tax avoidance behavior, likely
face lower proprietary costs from full disclosure and have higher FIN 48 disclosure quality.
A negative and significant value of b2CETR implies that a ﬁrm that pays higher effective tax
rates faces higher proprietary costs from full disclosure, and have lower quality tax
disclosures.
I add UTB to the Robinson & Schmidt (2013) model. It is measured as the log of the

14

Results are robust to not winsorizing the CETR variable.
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year-end balance of UTB tax reserves. Firms that possess large UTB tax reserve balances
may be sufficiently opaque due to the aggregation of many large positions and not be
motivated to alter FIN 48 disclosure quality. Similarly, a firm with a small UTB balance
may not be concerned with higher quality disclosure because the IRS may have good
information on small balances. However, in general, firms may not want to provide any
incremental information that can allow the IRS to better ascertain the magnitude of the
reserve for specific positions. As such, I do not make a prediction for UTB.1516
Prior research finds a positive association between firm size and disclosure quality
(Lang and Lundholm 1993). To control for the possibility that FIN 48 disclosure quality is
correlated with disclosure quality more generally, I include firm characteristics that predict
comprehensive disclosure: size (SIZE), profitability (PFT), capital intensity (CAPINT),
leverage (LTDA), and investment opportunities (MB). Limiting the sample to S&P 1500
firms may bias me against finding results as these firms are likely used to scrutiny and may
have already taken into account attention from tax jurisdictions. However, relatively larger
firms also face increased visibility and attention from the media or regulators which may
increase the likelihood of lower quality tax disclosure to reduce potential political costs,
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Additionally, large firms are in a better position to “hide”
information contained in any single disclosure due to the sheer volume of disclosures.
Capital intensity is a proxy for entry barriers, and disclosure quality is likely to increase

15

In untabulated results, I control for changes to the current year portion of the UTB balance and the total annual
change to UTB balance. My results are robust to both specifications.
16
The Schedule UTP transition rule does not require firms to report tax positions taken in a tax year beginning
before January 1, 2010, even if a reserve is recorded with respect to that tax position in audited financial statements
issued in 2010 or later. Thus, changes to FIN 48 disclosure quality may be driven by additions or the net change to
the prior year portion of the UTB balance. In untabulated results, to control for the potential impact of prior year
positions, I add to the model a variable for the addition to prior year positions and a variable for the net change to
prior year positions. My results are unchanged.
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as the threat of entry decreases (Cohen 2003). Agency problems associated with debt increase
with leverage. However, there may be an inverse relation between higher leverage, which
implies less equity, and cost savings in private information acquisition. Prior research finds
mixed results concerning the effect of performance on disclosure, thus I do not make a
prediction for my measure of profitability (Skinner 1994; Lang and Lundholm 1993).
Investors commonly use the market-to-book ratio to measure the investment opportunity set
and the related financing considerations. The market-to-book ratio also proxies for the
information asymmetry between management and investors, an important determinant of the
disclosure choice (Verrecchia 1990).
Firms that pay higher tax fees to their auditors (TAXFEES) reserve more sufﬁciently
for uncertain tax positions (Gleason and Mills 2011). If firms disclose more information in
response to Schedule UTP, it is possible that there are Schedule UTP implementation costs.
I include number of days between the year-end and the annual filing date (DAYSFILE) as a
proxy for implementation costs. Prior studies show that information asymmetry and the
demand for information can increase ﬁrms’ incentives to make high-quality disclosures
(Bhushan 1989; Lang and Lundholm 1993). A positive association between analyst
forecasting activity, ANALYSTS, and the level of ﬁnancial disclosure would be consistent
with the prior literature. The number of internal control weaknesses (WEAKYRS) could
capture complexities associated with the ﬁrm’s internal information environment, which may
impact the ability to calculate and substantiate a ﬁrm’s tax positions. Firms reporting a
control weakness in their tax accounts (WEAKYRS) may have greater difﬁculty analyzing
and substantiating their tax positions.
Literature suggests that ﬁrm monitoring affects disclosure quality. I include control
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variables that measure the various aspects of corporate governance (Warfield, Wild, and Wild
1995). In my setting, it is unclear whether a high-quality FIN 48 disclosure potentially
jeopardizes the sustainability of tax strategies or reduces information asymmetry with
investors. Therefore, I do not make predictions on my measures of internal governance, the
percentage of insiders on the board (BODINSIDE), the average number of additional boards
on which current directors serve (BODOTHER), and the number of board interlocks
(BODLOCKS). I expect higher quality disclosure as indicated by positive coefficients on the
external governance measures, when the firm uses a Big-four audit firm (BIG4) and operates
in a highly regulated industry (REGDUM) due to additional monitoring.
Prior research ﬁnds that the threat of shareholder litigation can have negative effects
on disclosure decisions (Skinner 1994; Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994; Kasznik and
Lev 1995; Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther 2000). The potential for legal action related to
inadequate or untimely disclosures can improve disclosure. Where a signiﬁcant amount of
judgment is inherent in making the disclosure, litigation risk has the potential to reduce
incentives to provide disclosure. Consistent with prior literature, I include an indicator
variable for ﬁrms in high-litigation industries (LITDUM). I do not make a prediction on
LITDUM as the net impact of litigation risk is unclear.
Multinational firms likely face greater information asymmetry than domestic firms.
Typically, the demand from stakeholders for tax information should be higher the greater the
extent of foreign operations (FOROPS) because multinational firms face more tax-planning
opportunities and face tax uncertainty in several different tax jurisdictions. 17 Investors may

17

I follow Robinson & Schidmt (2013) for the specification of FOROPS as the number of times a firm reports foreign
pretax income (PIFO) as a percentage of the number of times a firm reports total pretax income (over the previous
five years). My results are robust to using the alternate specification of foreign income as a percentage of total revenue
(PIFO/SALE).
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want more disclosure to reduce uncertainty surrounding the sustainability of tax positions
and future tax cash flow. I also include BUS_SEG and GEO_SEG to control for the
complexity of the ﬁrms’ underlying business (Li 2008; Li 2010). Firms with complex
operations are more likely to have complex tax positions. Increased complexity may increase
the burden of applying the two-step process of FIN 48 to each tax position to determine if it
should be reserved as failing to meet the FIN 48 standard of being more-likely-than-not to be
sustained upon examination by the relevant tax authority and then to calculate the appropriate
tax liability for the uncertain tax position.
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V. Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the disclosure score dependent
variables for the sample of 1,456 firm-years. The COMPLETE disclosure score has a range of 0
to 6 and the mean (median) is 5 (5).18 CLARITY ranges from 0 to 4 and measures the precision of
the required disclosures by capturing the presence or absence of important clarifying information
needed to understand and interpret the disclosure. The mean (median) of 1.19 (1) indicates that
firms exercise significant discretion with regard to the transparency and interpretability FIN 48
disclosures.
Panel B of Table 3 presents the means for the pre-Schedule UTP and post-Schedule UTP
samples and a t-test of significance of the difference in means for each of the disclosure scores.
The difference in the means for pre- and post- Schedule UTP univariate CLARITY disclosure
scores is marginally significant at the 10% level. This preliminary finding provides univariate
support that the discretionary components of FIN 48 disclosure quality declines following the
adoption of Schedule UTP.
Panel C of Table 3 presents the means for the pre-Schedule UTP and post-Schedule UTP
samples and a t-test of significance of the difference in means for the individual components of
the COMPLETE and CLARITY disclosure scores. By construction, the sample has one hundred
percent compliance for C1_UTB. Thus it is excluded from the COMPLETE component measure.
There are reasonably high compliance levels for each of the individual components except
C2_CHANGE and C8_ADOPT. C2_CHANGE requires that firms explain changes to their FIN 48

18

When using the Robinson & Schmidt (2013) complete score that ranges from 0 to 8, my mean (median) COMPLETE
is 6.20 (6) for compliance with the eight mandated components of FIN 48 disclosure. This result is consistent with
the complete score of 7.05(7.33) from the Robinson & Schmidt (2013) sample when adjusted for firms no longer
disclosing the initial adoption year impact of FIN 48 (8C_ADOPT).
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reserve balance. These descriptives are consistent with the findings of SEC comment letters
summarized by PwC. Firm include changes in the tabular reconciliation, but fail to provide
additional detail as to the nature of the tax position causing the change. C8_ADOPT is the impact
of the initial adoption of FIN 48. It is only required in the initial year of adoption and many firms
no longer report the 2007 FIN 48 adoption impact. As such, I exclude C8_ADOPT from the
compliance measure COMPLETE. The t-test provides univariate support that the CL1_NONETR
discretionary disclosure declines post Schedule UTP.
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in the regressions.
BIG4 mean of .95 indicates that almost all S&P 1500 firms in the sample use a Big 4 auditor.
DAYSFILE mean of 91.82 indicates that firms file the annual 10-K within three months of the close
of the fiscal year. Thus, the 2010 Form 10-K on average is filed by March 31, 2011. The 2010
corporate tax return is filed by March 15, 2011 or the extended deadline of September 15, 2011.
Thus, the 2010 Form 10-K is the most relevant source of public tax disclosure for calendar year
2010 for the IRS. T-tests are significant for the difference in the means for pre- and post- Schedule
UTP tax fees paid to the auditor, analyst following, business segments and geographic segments.
The increase to auditor provided tax services suggests that firms incurred increased costs to comply
with Schedule UTP. An increase in analyst following suggests that analysts were also interested
in how FIN 48 disclosure quality would change surrounding Schedule UTP adoption. Disclosing
more geographic segments may be an indication of the extent of foreign uncertain tax positions
included in the aggregated FIN 48 reserves. Disclosing more geographic segments potentially
signals a smaller “slice of the pie” related to federal uncertain tax positions disclosed in IRS
Schedule UTP and thus lowers the proprietary costs associated with higher disclosure quality.
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Test of Hypothesis
Table 5 presents the results of tests of my hypothesis that firms do not change their FIN 48
disclosure quality in response to IRS Schedule UTP. The variable of interest, is indicator variable
SchUTP. In column 1, the COMPLETE regression, the variable of interest is positive but not
significant.

This finding is consistent with firms maintaining compliance with mandatory

components of disclosure in the face of potential IRS scrutiny following the adoption of IRS
Schedule UTP. As firms likely anticipate increased IRS attention, they are motivated to comply
with the “letter of the law.” However, in column 2, the negative and highly significant result for
CLARITY shows that firms respond to IRS Schedule UTP by reducing their discretionary
disclosure of precise elements of FIN 48 disclosure that provide clarifying information needed to
better understand and interpret the disclosure.19 The economic significance of the SchUTP
coefficient for the CLARITY disclosure score is an on average decrease of 8.4 percent. This is
calculated as the SchUTP coefficient -.090 multiplied by the standard deviation of the CLARITY
sample .93 from Panel A of Table 3. Thus, following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP, firms on
average reduce discretionary FIN 48 disclosures by 8.4 percent.
Because I find that firms reduce their discretionary disclosures to reduce the transparency
of FIN 48 disclosures but find no evidence that firms reduce disclosure of mandatory items from
the FIN 48 reporting guidelines, I further examine a mandatory component of the COMPLETE
measure to determine if firms comply with the disclosure but provide less information. Table 6
presents the results of an examination of how firms alter the information contained in the forwardlooking statement estimating the potential change to the UTB reserve balance in the next twelve
months (7C_FWD). The forward-looking statement is an important component of FIN 48

19

The CLARITY Poisson regression with fixed effects drops 142 firms or 284 firm-years that have no change in
CLARITY score, primarily firms that have a zero CLARITY disclosure score in 2009 and 2010.
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disclosure because it can assist or hinder the ability of investors to determine the related impact on
a firm’s cash flows (Dunbar et al. 2010). Column 1 indicates that firms do not change their
compliance with providing the required forward-looking statement. However, the negative and
significant column 3 SchUTP result indicates that following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP
firms are less likely to provide a numerical estimate of the anticipated change to their UTB reserve
balance.
Prior to Schedule UTP, firms disclosed a numerical point estimate or potential range for
how UTB reserve balances may change in the next year. Subsequent to Schedule UTP adoption,
firms with non-zero UTB reserve balances are more likely to comply with the forward-looking
statement requirement by describing a potential UTB reserve change as “possible,” “uncertain,”
“immaterial,” or “not significant.”20 This change is an important loss of information to investors
concerned with future after-tax cash flow. This finding is consistent with recent SEC comment
letters that describe FIN 48 disclosures as not providing enough early warning about how FIN 48
reserves could potentially change in the near term (PwC 2015). It is a strategic decision for a firm
to not provide a value for estimated changes to UTB reserve balances due to settlement or
expiration of statute of limitation. The IRS only has descriptions of uncertain tax positions from
Schedule UTP. Any incremental information gained from FIN 48 disclosures about expected
changes in the next year can help the IRS to triangulate to relevant uncertain tax positions from
Schedule UTP that are close to settlement or expiration to obtain an idea of potential magnitude
for the uncertain tax position. The column 2 result supports the assertion that firms reduce the
quality of FIN 48 disclosures while continuing to comply with the mandatory components of the
disclosure.

20

See Appendix B for an example of a firm that changes its disclosure in this way.
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Table 7 presents results for the individual components of the CLARITY discretionary
disclosure score. This breakdown provides insight into the specific mechanisms for decreased
disclosure quality. Each of the components has a negative coefficient for the SchUTP variable of
interest. However, the result is negative and significant for 1CL_NONETR, indicating that firms
are less likely to provide an explanation for the portion of UTB balances that do not impact ETR.
For instance, if UTB reserve balances do not impact ETR, it would be useful for an investor to
know if that is due to goodwill from an acquisition or timing differences that impact deferred tax
accounts. Reducing aspects of CLARITY makes FIN 48 disclosures more opaque and potentially
less useful to the IRS to identify relevant amounts to be able to determine the magnitude of the
uncertain tax positions described in Schedule UTP. An unintended outcome is that this change
also reduces the usefulness of FIN 48 disclosures to investors and other stakeholders. My findings
are consistent with the rise in SEC comment letters surrounding the lack of clarity of FIN 48
disclosures.
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VI. Additional Analysis
To further examine the firms that experience a decline in their overall discretionary disclosure, I
create an indicator variable that captures whether a firm has a decline in their CLARITY score
following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. This methodology allows me to focus on firms that
experience a decline in their discretionary disclosure, rather than Table 4 primary results which
examine the level of firms’ discretionary disclosure.

Additionally, I include measures for

components of the tabular reconciliation of the FIN 48 reserve balance. Untabulated results show
that firms with the largest net reductions to FIN 48 reserves balances are more likely to reduce
discretionary FIN 48 disclosure quality following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. This finding
is consistent with the Towery (2017) result that firms subject to IRS Schedule UTP reduce their
FIN 48 reserves. My result supports that discretionary disclosure quality is a complementary lever
that firms manipulate in addition to changing their financial reporting by reducing their FIN 48
reserve balance in response to IRS Schedule UTP.
In additional analysis, I convert the dependent variable from the Table 7 model to an
indicator variable that captures the change from a firm providing a discretionary disclosure in 2009
and no longer providing the discretionary disclosure in 2010 following the adoption of IRS
Schedule UTP for each component of the CLARITY discretionary disclosure measure.
Descriptives reveal that the most reduction in discretionary disclosure occurs with the
CL1_NONETR and CL3_INCLUDE measures. For the firms that provide these discretionary
disclosures in 2009, respectively there is a 26% and 20% decline in 2010 following the adoption
of IRS Schedule UTP. Rerunning Table 7 analysis, shows that analyst following (ANALYSTS) is
a negative and highly significant determinant for the decline in disclosure for the CL1_NONETR
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and CL3_INCLUDE measures. This suggests that when analyst following is low, firms are more
likely to reduce their discretionary disclosures.
Demand for Information
The additional analysis above is consistent with firms being accountable to other
stakeholders and facing a “multi-audience problem” (Bhorjraj, Blacconiere, and D'souza 2004).
Firms may face the dilemma of not wanting to reveal tax information that can be used against them
by the tax authority and wanting to be as transparent as possible to outside stakeholders (Mills et
al. 2010). Given this competing motivation for higher quality disclosure, I examine cross sections
for the CLARITY composite discretionary disclosure measure where firms may face demand for
higher quality information. Table 8 reports the cross section for firms with above the median and
below the median analyst following. Firms with high analyst following likely face a stronger
demand for information. Firms with low analyst following may face less scrutiny. Consistent
with these expectations, in column 2 firms with high analyst following do not reduce their FIN 48
discretionary disclosures. However, the negative and highly significant SchUTP coefficient in
column 3 shows that firms with low analyst following reduce their FIN 48 disclosure quality by
reducing the clarity of their FIN 48 disclosures.
Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay (2014) find that firms with greater tax complexity increase
disclosure to reduce information asymmetry. Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams (2016) assert
that the volatility of effective tax rates captures whether tax strategies increase the overall level of
uncertainty regarding future tax payments. Drake, Lusch, and Stekelberg (2016) operationalize
the construct of tax risk using the Guenther et al. (2016) measure of volatility of effective tax rates
and find that investors negatively value tax risk. This aversion to tax risk is consistent with tax
professionals shifting focus from traditional tax compliance and planning to the promulgation of
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tax risk management surveys and services (Hutchens and Rego 2015; PwC 2015; EY 2014;
Deloitte 2014; KPMG 2011). Given the increased focus on tax risk and investor demand to reduce
tax uncertainty, in additional cross-sectional analysis, I examine whether Schedule UTP impacts
FIN 48 disclosure quality differently for high tax-risk firms and low tax-risk firms.
Because investors negatively value tax risk, I expect that high task-risk firms to be more
sensitive to changes in information asymmetry and as a consequence, would be less likely to
decrease their disclosure quality following the adoption of Schedule UTP. Thus, I expect that high
tax-risk firms will maintain or increase disclosure quality in response to Schedule UTP. However,
I expect low tax-risk firms to face lower trade-off costs between reducing transparency to the IRS
and increasing information asymmetry to investors.
Table 8, column 4 examines the CLARITY disclosure quality dependent variable while
including a TAX RISK variable and an interaction of TAX RISK and SchUTP. TAX RISK is
measured using the Guenther et al. (2016) measure of the standard deviation of annual cash ETRs
measured over a five-year period (t-4 to t). The finding that firms provide lower CLARITY of FIN
48 disclosures following IRS Schedule UTP adoption is consistent with Table 4 for SchUTP. The
TAX RISK variable is negative and marginally significant. However, the interaction of TAX RISK
and SchUTP is positive and insignificant. In columns 5 and 6, I bifurcate the sample into abovethe-median and below-the-median measures of TAX RISK. It would be most detrimental to high
TAX RISK firms to increase information asymmetry by not providing necessary information to
reduce investor uncertainty surrounding the magnitude and sustainability of uncertain tax positions
and future tax cash flow. Column 5 results suggest that high TAX RISK firms do not change the
CLARITY of FIN 48 disclosures following Schedule UTP adoption. In contrast, the column 6
results are negative and highly significant for below-the-median TAX RISK firms. This suggests
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that low TAX RISK firms are less concerned with reducing investor information asymmetry and
more concerned with reducing transparency to the IRS. This finding is interesting considering
recent literature that examines the implications of TAX RISK. It also indicates that certain firms
are more inclined to reduce tax disclosure quality in response to increased tax return reporting
requirements. Multiplying the SchUTP coefficient -.164 by the standard deviation of .73 provides
an economic significance of twelve percent. Firms with low tax risk have twelve percent lower
discretionary FIN 48 disclosure quality following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP.
Bozanic et al. (2017) find that firms increase their volume of tax footnote disclosure
following the adoption of IRS Schedule UTP. To test whether my results are consistent with the
findings from prior literature, I test whether firms disclose more years in their tabular
reconciliations following Schedule UTP adoption using an ordered logit regression with where the
dependent variable is the number of years that a firm includes in its tabular reconciliation of FIN
48 reserves. In untabulated results, I that firms are more likely to disclose more prior years of data
following the adoption of Schedule UTP. The economic significance of the coefficient on the
indicator variable for Schedule UTP shows that firms are 10% more likely to include disclose an
extra year following the adoption of Schedule UTP. Review of data shows that the firms that
started disclosing an extra year of data in 2010 could have also disclosed three years in 2009, but
did not. Furthermore, in preliminary data collection for a sample of firms with less than $100
million in assets and thus not subject to Schedule UTP in 2010, I find zero observations of firms
increasing the number of prior years included in their FIN 48 tabular reconciliation and disclosure
discussion. This finding gives me reasonable comfort that my results are consistent with the
measures of disclosure volume captured in Bozanic et al. (2017). My results do not contradict
Bozanic et al. (2017), but rather provide additional insight into the findings of that study.
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Robustness
It is also possible that my results are driven by overall disclosure quality. To address this
concern, I include the Chen, Miao and Shevlin (2015) measure to conduct additional analyses to
control for the firm’s overall disclosure quality. This measure captures the ‘fineness’ of financial
information, as reflected in the level of disaggregation of accounting data items in the financial
statements.

This measure of disclosure quality is appropriate because it captures a firm’s

propensity to disclose more detailed financial information. Table 9 reports the results of the model
presented in Table 5 when including the Chen et al. 2015 disclosure quality variable. My main
results are unaffected. Thus, it appears that the FIN 48 disclosure quality that I examine in this
study is distinct from overall disclosure quality.
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VII. Conclusion
Using the 2010 introduction of IRS Schedule UTP, I provide evidence of an association
between increased tax return reporting requirements and reduced FIN 48 disclosure quality. I find
that firms respond to heightened proprietary costs of increased tax return reporting by reducing
discretionary FIN 48 disclosures to provide less incremental information. Additionally, my handcollected sample enables me to identify the individual components of FIN 48 disclosures that
change in response to Schedule UTP. In addition to finding that firms reduce the information
content of public tax disclosures in response to increased private tax disclosure to the IRS, I
identify the mechanisms by which firms reduce disclosure quality. Furthermore, my study
provides insight that reconciles findings from prior literature examining the impact of IRS
Schedule UTP documenting increased FIN 48 reserves and increased FIN 48 disclosure volume.
Whether FIN 48 disclosures are ultimately useful to the IRS in its audit process is uncertain.
However, my results indicate that there is less information available to users of the financial
statements because of the way firms respond to increased tax reporting requirements in Schedule
UTP. Thus, I contribute to the literature on the consequences of changes in tax reporting
requirements by identifying the unintended consequence of firms providing reduced financial
statement tax disclosure quality in response to increased tax return reporting. My findings indicate
that it is necessary to consider that increased tax return reporting, in addition to affecting financial
reporting decisions, is also associated with a contemporaneous change in the disclosure quality
related to those financial reporting items. In addition to being concerned with whether the financial
reporting numbers change, my study highlights that regulators, practitioners, and other
stakeholders should also be concerned with how disclosure about the numbers changes in response
to increased tax return reporting. This implication is important as the FASB and IASB are
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currently considering international standards for tax contingency reporting. My results suggest
that it is necessary to further consider how increased private tax disclosure and firm discretion in
public tax disclosure have the potential to reduce public tax disclosure quality.
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Appendix A
Example of FIN 48 10-K financial statement disclosure and disclosure scores
Loews Corporation December 31, 2009
A reconciliation of the beginning and ending amount of unrecognized tax benefits is as follows: (1C_UTB)
Year Ended December 31

2008

2009

(In millions)
Balance at January 1
Additions based on tax positions related to the current year
Additions for tax positions related to prior years
Lapse of statute of limitations
Balance at December 31

$

$

24 $
4
5
(6)

20
6

$

24

27

(2)

Certain foreign income tax returns will no longer be subject to examination and as a result, there is a
reasonable possibility that the amount of unrecognized tax benefits will decrease by $1 million (7C_FWD) . At
December 31, 2009, there were $27 million of tax benefits that if recognized would affect the effective rate
(3C_ETR)(1CL_NONETR).
The Company recognizes interest accrued related to: (i) unrecognized tax benefits in Interest expense and
(ii) tax refund claims in Other revenues on the Consolidated Statements of Income. The Company recognizes
penalties in Income tax expense on the Consolidated Statements of Income (5C_CLASS). During 2009, the
Company recorded approximately $3 million for interest income and $5 million for penalties. As of December 31,
2009, the Company recognized a liability for interest of $4 million and penalties of $13 million
(4C_INTPEN)(4CL_LUMP).
The Company’s 2006 tax year remains subject to examination and the 2008 tax year is under examination by
the IRS (6C_OPEN). Although the outcomes of tax audits are always uncertain, the Company believes that any
adjustments resulting from audits will not have a material impact on its results of operations, financial position and
cash flows. The Company and/or its subsidiaries also file income tax returns in various state, local and foreign
jurisdictions. These returns, with few exceptions, are no longer subject to examination by the various taxing
authorities before 2005.
1C_UTB
2C_CHANGE
3C_ETR
4C_INTPEN
5C_CLASS
6C_OPEN
7C_FWD
8C_ADOPT
COMPLETE

=0
=0
= .5
=1
=1
=1
=1
=
= 4.5

1CL_NONETR = 1
2CL_GROSS
=0
3CL_INCL

=0

4CL_LUMP
CLARITY

=1
=2

Not included in COMPLETE measure
No explanations provided for additions to current year or prior year.
Only disclosed the impact of the year end UTB balance on effective tax rate.

Not included in COMPLETE measure
The entire UTB balance impacts ETR, so there is no non-ETR impact to disclose
The disclosure does not explicitly state whether the FIN 48 reserves are
reported gross or net of federal benefits for state or other taxes.
The disclosure does not explicitly state whether the UTB reserve includes the
liabilities for interest and penalties.
The disclosure separately reports interest and penalties.
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Appendix B
Example of Table 6 Result
The firm no longer provides a numerical estimate as a part of their forward-looking statement
post-Schedule UTP adoption. In this example, the UTB balance that potentially impacts the
effect tax rate increases by .5 billion, indicating that the balance is material.
Abbot Laboratories 2009
The total amount of unrecognized tax benefits that, if recognized, would impact the effective tax
rate is approximately $2.0 billion. Abbott expects the range of the decrease in the recorded
amounts of unrecognized tax benefits, …, to range from zero to $680 million, arising from the
conclusion of these tax matters.
Abbott Laboratories 2010
The total amount of unrecognized tax benefits that, if recognized, would impact the effective tax
rate is approximately $2.5 billion. Although it is reasonably possible that a change in the balance
of unrecognized tax benefits may occur within the next twelve months, at this time it is not
possible to estimate the range of change due to the uncertainty of the potential outcomes.
Examples of Schedule UTP narrative descriptions taken from Towery (2017)
Transfer pricing: “The taxpayer allocated management service costs between its domestic
subsidiaries and a foreign subsidiary located in Country X using a methodology the taxpayer
considers reasonable. The issue is whether the taxpayer’s method of allocating these costs is
acceptable by the IRS.”
Research and experimentation credit: “The taxpayer incurred support department costs that
were allocated to various research projects based upon a methodology the taxpayer considers
reasonable. The issue is whether the taxpayer’s method of allocating these costs is acceptable by
the IRS.”
Business expense deduction: “The taxpayer claimed a deduction for travel and entertainment
expenses for conventions and sales meetings. The issues are whether adequate documentation
has been retained to substantiate the deductions claimed and whether some of the expenses
constitute entertainment subject to a 50% limitation.”
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Appendix C
Example of Increased Disclosure of Prior Years
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION

2010

Uncertain Tax Positions – In 2010, the company reached a final settlement with the IRS and Joint Committee with
respect to the IRS’ examination of the company’s tax returns for the years 2004 through 2006. As a result of this
settlement, the company reduced its liability for uncertain tax positions, including previously accrued interest, by
$311 million, which was recorded as a reduction to the company’s effective tax rate.
In 2009, the company reached a final settlement agreement with the IRS and Joint Committee with respect to the
IRS’ examination of the company’s tax returns for the years 2001 through 2003. As a result of this settlement, the
company reduced its liability for uncertain tax positions by $60 million, which was recorded as a reduction to the
company’s effective tax rate.
In 2008, the company reached a final settlement agreement with the IRS and Joint Committee with respect to
the IRS’ audit of the TRW tax returns for the years 1999 through 2002. As a result of this settlement, the
company reduced its liability for uncertain tax positions by $126 million (including accrued interest of
$44 million), $95 million of which was recorded as a reduction of goodwill.21
As of December 31, 2010, the estimated value of the company’s uncertain tax positions which are more-likely-thannot to be sustained on examination was a liability of $137 million which includes accrued interest of $11 million.
This liability is included in other current liabilities and other long-term liabilities in the consolidated statements of
financial position. Assuming sustainment of these positions by the taxing authorities, the reversal of the amounts
accrued would reduce the company’s effective tax rate.
Unrecognized Tax Benefits – Unrecognized tax benefits represent the gross value of the company’s tax positions that
have not been reflected in the consolidated statements of operations and includes the value of the company’s
recorded uncertain tax positions. If the income tax benefits from these tax positions are ultimately realized, such
realization would affect the company’s effective tax rate.
The change in unrecognized tax benefits during 2010 and 2009, excluding interest, is as follows:
December 31
$ in millions
2010
2009
2008
Unrecognized tax benefits at beginning of the year
$ 429
$416
$488
Additions based on tax positions related to the current year
19
12
5
Additions for tax positions of prior years
4
61
15
Statute expiration
(9)
Settlements
(326)
(60)
(83)
Net change in unrecognized tax benefits
(303)
13
(72)
Unrecognized tax benefits at end of the year
$ 126
$429
$416
Although the company believes that it has adequately provided for all of its tax positions, amounts asserted by
taxing authorities in future years could be greater than the company’s accrued positions. Accordingly, additional
provisions on income tax related matters could be recorded in the future due to revised estimates, settlement or other
resolution of the underlying tax matters. In addition, open tax years related to state and foreign jurisdictions remain
subject to examination but are not considered material. The IRS is currently conducting an examination of the
company’s tax returns for the years 2007 through 2009. During the year ended December 31, 2010, 2009, and
2008, the company recorded approximately $88 million, $6 million, and $(29) million of net interest income
(expense), respectively, within its federal and foreign, and state income tax provisions.

Appendix C
21

Note that disclosing prior year information is a low cost disclosure strategy as it is a longstanding IRS policy to
not reopen tax years that have been examined and closed (Internal Revenue Manual 1.2.1.4.1, P-4-3 (12-21-1984).
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Example of Increased Disclosure of Prior Years
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION

2009

Uncertain Tax Positions – During the third quarter of 2009, the company reached a final settlement agreement with
the IRS and the U.S. Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (Joint Committee) with respect to the IRS’ audit of
the company’s tax returns for the years 2001 through 2003. As a result of this settlement, the company reduced its
liability for uncertain tax positions by $60 million, which was recorded as a reduction to the company’s effective tax
rate.
During the third quarter of 2008, the company reached a final settlement agreement with the IRS and Joint
Committee with respect to the IRS’ audit of the TRW tax returns for the years 1999 through 2002. As a result of this
settlement, the company reduced its liability for uncertain tax positions by $126 million (including accrued interest
of $44 million), $95 million of which was recorded as a reduction of goodwill.
As of December 31, 2009, the estimated value of the company’s uncertain tax positions was a liability of
$423 million which includes accrued interest of $61 million. If the company’s positions are sustained by the taxing
authorities in favor of the company, the reversal of the amounts accrued for uncertain tax positions would reduce the
company’s effective tax rate.
Unrecognized Tax Benefits – Unrecognized tax benefits consist of the carrying value of the company’s recorded
uncertain tax positions as well as the potential tax benefits that could result from other tax positions that have not
been recognized in the financial statement under GAAP. At December 31, 2009, and 2008, unrecognized tax
benefits that have not been recognized in the financial statements amounted to $67 million.
The change in unrecognized tax benefits during 2009 and 2008, excluding interest, is as follows:
$ in millions
Unrecognized tax benefit at beginning of the year
Additions based on tax positions related to the current year
Additions for tax positions of prior years
Statute expiration
Settlements
Net change in unrecognized tax benefits
Unrecognized tax benefit at end of the year

December 31
2009
2008
$416
$488
12
5
61
15
(9)
(60)
(83)
13
(72)
$429
$416

Although the company believes that it has adequately provided for all of its tax positions, amounts asserted by
taxing authorities in future years could be greater than the company’s accrued positions. Accordingly, additional
provisions on income tax related matters could be recorded in the future due to revised estimates, settlement or other
resolution of the underlying tax matters. In addition, open tax years related to state and foreign jurisdictions remain
subject to examination but are not considered material. The IRS is currently conducting an examination of the
company’s tax returns for the years 2004 through 2006. It is reasonably possible that the company will reach a
settlement with the IRS and Joint Committee within the next twelve months which may result in a material net
reduction in the company’s liability for uncertain tax positions.
During the year ended December 31, 2009, the company recorded approximately $6 million of interest income, and
during the year ended December 31, 2008, the company recorded $29 million of interest expense within its federal
and foreign income tax provision.
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Table 1
Panel A: Disclosure Score Components
(see Appendix A for more detail)

Variable

Definition

COMPLETE – mandatory components
1C_UTB
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm discloses a tabular
reconciliation of beginning and ending UTB reserve balance, 0 otherwise.
2C_CHANGE

An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm disclosed a change
in the UTB balance during the year and explained the reason for the
change, 0 otherwise. A firm receives a 1 if there is no change to explain.

3C_ETR

A variable that takes the value 1 if the beginning and ending UTB balance
that would affect the ETR was disclosed or 0.5 if the UTB changed during
the year and only the beginning or ending that would affect the ETR was
disclosed (but not both), and 0 otherwise.
A variable that takes the value of 0.5 if accrued interest or penalty amount
related to UTB reserves is disclosed, 1 if both, and 0 if neither interest nor
penalty amounts are disclosed.
A variable that takes the value of 0.5 if the income statement classification
is disclosed for either penalty or interest (but not both), 1 if classification is
disclosed for both, and 0 if classification not disclosed.
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm discloses open
federal tax years, 0 otherwise.
A variable that takes the value of 1 if a complete forward-looking statement
of expected changes to the UTB reserve balance in the next twelve months
was made or 0.33 each for mention of the item, nature, and amount of the
expected change; or 0 otherwise.
A variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm discloses the adoption
adjustment for the initial period of adoption, 0 otherwise.

4C_INTPEN

5C_IPCLASS

6C_OPEN
7C_FWD

8C_ADOPT

CLARITY – discretionary components
1CL_NONETR
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm included a
discussion or amount of the UTB that does not affect the ETR (e.g.,
temporary differences, goodwill, or other comprehensive income
adjustments) included in the UTB, 0 otherwise.
If a firm discloses that their entire UTB balance would affect ETR, the
indicator variable is coded as a 1.
2CL_GROSS
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm explicitly stated
whether the reported UTB was gross or net, 0 otherwise.
3CL_INCL
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm explicitly stated
whether the reported UTB included interest and penalties, 0 otherwise.
4CL_LUMP
An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm reported accrued
interest and penalties separately, 0 otherwise.
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Table 1 (Continued)
Panel B: Regression Variables
Variable

Definition

COMPLETE

The adjusted sum for six required disclosure score components: 2C_CHG, 3C_ETR,
4C_INTPEN, 5C_CLASS, 6C_OPEN, and 7C_FWD.

CLARITY

The sum of four disclosure score components: 1CL_NONETR, 2CL_GROSS,
3CL_INCL, and 4CL_LUMP.

SchUTP

An indicator variable set to 1 for 2010 firm-years, and 0 otherwise.

CETR

3-year cash effective tax rate, measured as the sum of cash taxes paid (TXPD)
from three lagged years divided by the sum of total pre-tax income (PI) from
three lagged years.

UTB

The log of year-end UTB tax reserve balance.

SIZE

Firm size at year end, measured as the log of total assets (AT).

PFT

Profit margin at year end, measured as income before extraordinary items (IB)
divided by sales (SALE).

CAPINT

Capital intensity at year end, measured as net property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT) divided by total assets (AT).

LTDA

Debt-to-assets at year end, measured as long-term debt (DLT) divided by total
assets (AT).

MB

Market-to-book ratio year end, measured as the market value of equity
(PRCC_F * CSHO) divided by book common equity (CEQ).

BIG4

An indicator variable set to 1 if a firm retains a Big-four audit firm, and 0
otherwise.

BODINSIDE

The percentage of insiders (all directors who are officers or employees) on the
board of directors. Insiders are defined as all directors who are officers or
employees of the company. Risk Metrics.

BODLOCKS

The number of interlocks (where board members serve on other company boards
together) on the board of directors. Risk Metrics.

BODOTHER

The average number of other major boards of directors on which current board
members serve. Risk Metrics.
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Table 1 (Continued)
Panel B: Regression Variables
Variable

Definition

LITDUM

An indicator variable set to 1 if a firm is in a high litigation industry, and 0
otherwise. Four-digit SIC codes = 2833–2836, 8731–8734, 7371–7379,
3570–3577, and 3600–3674 (Francis et al. 1994).

REGDUM

An indicator variable set to 1 if a firm is in a highly regulated industry and 0
otherwise. Four-digit SIC codes = 4812–4813, 4833, 4841, 4811–4899,
4922–4924, 4931, 4941, 6021–6023, 6035–6036, 6141, 6311, 6321, 6331
(Warfield et al. 1995).

TAXFEES

Ratio of tax fees to total fees paid to the financial statement auditor in the year
preceding the FIN 48 disclosure. Audit Analytics database.

FOROPS

Number of times a firm reports foreign pretax income (PIFO) as a percentage
of the number of times a firm reports total pretax income (over the previous
five years).

DAYSFILE

Number of days between yearend and the actual filing date of the 10-K.

BUS_SEG

The logarithm of 1 plus the number of business segments from Compustat
segment data.

GEO_SEG

The logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographic segments from Compustat
segment data.

TAXRISK

The standard deviation of annual cash ETRs measured over a five-year period,
t-4 to t.
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Table 2
Sample Selection
Criteria
2009 S&P 1500
Non-December 31 year-end
No Compustat Reported UTB balance
(beginning or ending)
Additional observations identified
using Python Coding
*Missing FIN 48 disclosure in one or both
years
Drop observations with missing
regression variables in 2009 or 2010
Final sample for balanced panel 2009-2010

(450)
(296)

Firms
1,500
1,050
754

112

866

(31)
(107)

835
728
728

Firm-years

1,456

*FIN 48 Disclosure describes Uncertain Tax Benefits as immaterial and/or missing tabular reconciliation
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Disclosure Scores
Variable
COMPLETE
CLARITY

n

Mean

1456
1456

S.D.

5
1.19

0.62
0.93

Range of Disclosure Scores
Min
Median
Max
1
0

5
1

6
4

Notes: This panel presents descriptive statistics for disclosure scores for the entire sample.
COMPLETE = The sum of six required disclosure score components (see Appendix A); CLARITY = The sum of
four discretionary disclosure score components (see Appendix A).

Panel B: Disclosure Scores Pre and Post IRS Schedule UTP
PreSchUTP
Variable
COMPLETE
CLARITY

n
728
728

Mean
5.01
1.23

PostSchUTP
Mean
4.99
1.16

t-test for
Difference in
means
*

Notes: This panel presents descriptive statistics for disclosure scores for Pre (2009) and Post (2010) IRS Schedule
UTP. COMPLETE = The sum of six required disclosure score components (see Appendix A); CLARITY = The
sum of four discretionary disclosure score components (see Appendix A). *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Panel C: Disclosure Score Components Pre and Post IRS Schedule UTP

C1_UTB
C2_CHANGE
C3_ETR
C4_INTPEN
C5_CLASS
C6_OPEN
C7_FWD
C8_ADOPT

COMPLETE
Pre-Sch Post- Sch
UTP
UTP
1
1
0.24
0.22
0.95
0.95
0.88
0.89
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.96
0.87
0.86
0.56
0.01 ***

CL1_NONETR
CL2_GROSS
CL3_INCLUDE
CL4_LUMP

CLARITY
Pre-Sch
Post- Sch
UTP
UTP
0.30
0.26*
0.31
0.29
0.31
0.29
0.18
0.18

Notes: These panels presents descriptive statistics for the components of the COMPLETE and CLARITY disclosure
scores reported in panels for Pre (2009) and Post (2010) IRS Schedule UTP. Please see Table 1 for a complete
description of each component. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics
Regression Variables
Full
Sample
Variable
SchUTP
CETR
UTB
SIZE
PFT
CAPINT
LTDA
MB
BIG4
TAXFEES
DAYSFILE
ANALYSTS
WEAKYRS
BODINSIDE
BODLOCKS
BODOTHER
LITDUM
REGDUM
FOROPS
BUS_SEG
GEO_SEG

n = 1456
Mean
0.50
0.29
2.89
8.28
0.02
0.23
0.18
2.70
0.95
0.09
91.82
8.61
0.11
0.14
0.01
0.80
0.20
0.26
0.56
5.72
8.11

PreSchUTP
n= 728
Mean
0.00
0.30
2.92
8.23
-0.01
0.23
0.18
3.10
0.95
0.08
91.43
7.84
0.11
0.14
0.02
0.80
0.20
0.26
0.54
4.60
6.47

PostSchUTP

t-test for

n= 728
Difference
Mean
in means
1.00
0.27
2.86
8.32
0.05
0.23
0.17
2.30
0.95
0.10
**
92.20
9.37
***
0.12
0.14
0.01
0.79
0.20
0.26
0.57
6.85
***
9.75
***

Notes: This panel reports descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in the main regression analysis pre- and post-IRS Schedule
UTP. I deﬁne the variables as follows: SchUTP = A 0/1 indicator variable set to 1 if the year is 2010, 0 otherwise; CETR = three-year
average cash effective tax rate; UTB = end of year UTB tax reserve balance; SIZE = Firm measured as the log of total assets; PFT = Firm
proﬁt margin, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by sales; CAPINT = Firm capital intensity, measured as net property,
plant, and equipment divided by total assets; LTDA = Firm debt-to-assets, measured as long-term debt divided by total assets; MB = Firm
market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value of equity divided by book common equity; BIG4 = A 0/1 indicator variable set to 1 if
a ﬁrm is audited by a Big-four auditor, 0 otherwise; BODINSIDE = The percentage of insiders on the board of directors; BODLOCKS =
The number of interlocks on the board of directors; BODOTHER = The average number of other major boards of directors on which
current board members serve; LITDUM = A 0/1 indicator variable set to 1 for ﬁrms in high-litigation industries (Four-digit SIC codes =
2833–2836, 8731–8734, 7371–7379, 3570–3577, and 3600–3674), 0 otherwise; REGDUM = A 0/1 indicator variable set to 1 if a ﬁrm is
in a highly regulated industry (Four-digit SIC codes = 4812–4813, 4833, 4841, 4811–4899, 4922–4924, 4931, 4941, 6021–6023, 6035–
6036, 6141, 6311, 6321, 6331), 0 otherwise; ANALYSTS = The number of analysts following the ﬁrm at the yearend; WEAKYRS = The
number of years a ﬁrm had a control weakness in tax accounts; TAXFEES = Current year tax fees paid divided by total fees paid to auditor.
If a firm switched auditors during the year, the total tax fees and total fees paid are aggregated to calculate a percentage; FOROPS = The
extent of foreign operations, measured as the number of times a ﬁrm reports foreign pretax income as a percentage of the number of times
a ﬁrm reports total pretax income (over the previous 5 years); DAYSFILE = The number of days between the end of the calendar year and
the ﬁling of the 10-K; BUS_SEG = The logarithm of 1 plus the number of business segments; GEO_SEG = The logarithm of 1 plus the
number of geographic segments. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed) levels, respectively.
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Table 5
IRS Schedule UTP Tax Reporting Impact on FIN 48 Disclosure Quality

SchUTP
CETR
UTB
SIZE
PFT
CAPINT
LTDA
MB
BIG4
TAXFEES
DAYSFILE
ANALYSTS
WEAKYRS
BODINSIDE
BODLOCKS
BODOTHER
FOROPS

COMPLETE

CLARITY

0.013
(0.008)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.00
(0.007)
0.026
-0.028
-0.027***
(0.005)
-0.005
(0.182)
-0.007
(0.091)
0.000
0.000
0.007
(0.086)
-0.047
(0.069)
0.000
0.000
-0.003
(0.002)
0.045
(0.040)
-0.128
(0.125)
-0.048
(0.031)
0.022
(0.020)
0.00
(0.00)

-0.090***
(0.027)
-0.018
(0.015)
-0.058***
(0.020)
0.11
-0.096
0.021***
(0.007)
1.514***
(0.494)
0.083
(0.276)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.31
(0.267)
0.089
(0.248)
0.001
(0.001)
0.009
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.280)
-0.183
(0.299)
0.033
(0.026)
0.116*
(0.067)
0.00
(0.00)
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Table 5 (continued)
IRS Schedule UTP Tax Reporting Impact on FIN 48 Disclosure Quality

COMPLETE

CLARITY

-0.003
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.001)

0.010
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.003)

Firm Fixed
Effects

YES

YES

N
Firms

1,456
728

1,172
586

BUS_SEG
GEO_SEG

*, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed) levels, respectively. This table presents the
results of Poisson regressions (robust standard errors in parentheses in the second row) that evaluate the effect of
IRS Schedule UTP adoption on FIN 48 disclosure quality. I deﬁne the dependent variables as follows: COMPLETE
= The sum of six required disclosure score components (see Appendix A); CLARITY = The sum of four
discretionary disclosure score components (see Appendix A). See Tables 1 or 2 for independent variable deﬁnitions.
The CLARITY Poisson regression with fixed effects drops 142 firms or 284 firm-years that have no change in
CLARITY score, primarily firms that have a zero CLARITY disclosure score in 2009 and 2010.
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Table 6
IRS Schedule UTP Impact on the Content of Mandatory FIN 48 Disclosures
Forward-looking Statement
(7C_FWD)

Includes a Numerical Estimate
in Forward-looking Statement

0.104
(0.097)
0.271***
(0.084)

-0.157*
(0.088)
0.211***
(0.051)

CONTROLS

YES

YES

N
Pseudo R2

1456
0.078

1456
0.049

SchUTP
UTB

*, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed) levels, respectively. This table presents the results of
logit regressions (robust standard errors in parentheses in the second row) that evaluate the effect of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics on FIN 48 disclosure quality. I cluster standard errors by industry (using two-digit NAICS codes). I deﬁne
the dependent variables as follows: Forward-looking Statement is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm provides a
forward-looking statement about how the UTB balance is expected to change in the next twelve months, 0 otherwise.
Includes a Numerical Estimate in Forward-looking Statement is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the disclosure provides
a numerical point or range estimate of the expected change to the UTB balance in the next twelve months, 0 otherwise.
See Appendix B for FIN 48 disclosure examples.
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Table 7
IRS Schedule UTP Impact on the Discretionary of FIN 48 Disclosures
Non-ETR
Impact
1CL_NONETR

2CL_GROSS

Include/Exclude
Interest
3CL_INCL

Report I&P
Separately
4CL_LUMP

SchUTP

-0.212**
(0.091)

-0.084
(0.058)

-0.102
(0.068)

-0.085
(0.076)

UTB

-0.169***
(0.063)

0.159***
(0.057)

0.044
(0.048)

0.038
(0.081)

CONTROLS

YES

YES

YES

YES

N
Pseudo R2

1,456
0.040

1,456
0.040

1,456
0.023

1,456
0.032

Gross/Net

*, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed) levels, respectively. This table presents the
results of logit regressions (robust standard errors in parentheses in the second row) that evaluate the effect of ﬁrmspeciﬁc characteristics on components of FIN 48 disclosure CLARITY. I cluster standard errors by industry (using
two-digit NAICS codes). I deﬁne the dependent variables as follows: 1CL_NONETR is an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 if the firm included a discussion or amount of the UTB that does not affect the ETR (e.g.,
temporary differences, goodwill, or other comprehensive income adjustments) included in the UTB, 0 otherwise;
2CL_GROSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm explicitly stated whether the reported UTB
was gross or net, 0 otherwise; 3CL_INCL is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm explicitly
stated whether the reported UTB included interest and penalties, 0 otherwise; 4CL_LUMP is an indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 if the firm reported interest and penalties separately, 0 otherwise.
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Table 8
Additional Analysis

SchUTP
Analyst
Analyst * SchUTP
Tax Risk
Tax Risk * SchUTP
UTB

Analyst
Following

High
Analyst
Following

Low
Analyst
Following

Tax Risk

High
Tax
Risk

-0.099***

-0.035

-0.132***

-0.106***

-0.063

-0.005
0.004

0.006

-0.269

0.012*

0.009

Low
Tax
Risk
0.164**
*
0.012

-0.057***

-0.039

-0.068**

-0.305
0.020
-0.056***

CONTROLS
Firm Fixed Effects

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

N
Firms

1,172
586

590
295

574
287

1,104
552

602
301

570
285

-0.092** -0.042**

*, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed) levels, respectively. This table presents the
results of Poisson regressions. High Analyst Following (column 2) is above the median number of analysts and Low
Analyst Following (column 3) is below the median number of analysts. TAX RISK is measured as the standard
deviation of annual Cash ETRs measured over a five-year period, t-4 to t. High Tax Risk (column 5) is above the
median tax risk and Low Tax Risk (column 6) is below the median tax risk.
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Table 9
Overall Disclosure Quality
Mandatory Discretionary
SchUTP

0.015

-0.131***

Disclosure Quality
Chen, Miao, Shevlin
2015

-0.004

0.124

UTB

-0.005

-0.058

CONTROLS

YES

YES

Firm Fixed Effects

YES

YES

N
Firms

1,122
561

892
446

*, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed) levels, respectively. This table presents the
results of Poisson regressions (robust standard errors in parentheses in the second row). Table 9 presents the model
from Table 5 with an additional control for overall disclosure quality from Chen, Miao and Shevlin 2015.

60

Vita
Dr. Larzette Hale, CPA was the first African American woman to receive a PhD in
Accounting in 1955 from the University of Wisconsin. In May of 2017, Michelle Harding will
become the first African American female to graduate with a PhD in Accounting from the
University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Michelle is tremendously grateful to Dr. Hale and the other
trailblazers who made her academic journey possible.
During her time at the University of Tennessee, she witnessed the defunding of the Office
of Diversity and Inclusion. It was a heartbreaking experience as a student of color to see the
University’s inability to effectively advocate for the importance of diversity. The lack of African
American and Hispanic faculty across campus contributes to the lack of diverse graduate students.
It is Dr. Harding’s hope that as she enters academia, she can help to bridge this gap. She embraces
the responsibility to be a role model as a researcher and in the classroom for the next generation
of accounting and business leaders.
After more than ten years of industry experience and learning more about pursuing a
doctoral degree in accounting through the KPMG PhD Project Conference, Michelle chose to
pursue a career in academia. It is her desire to answer interesting and important research questions.
Her dissertation, “The Impact of Increased Tax Return Reporting on Financial Statement Tax
Disclosure Quality: Evidence from IRS Schedule UTP,” examines the intersection of public and
private tax disclosure. She looks forward to continuing her tax disclosure research stream.
Michelle is a recipient of the KPMG and AICPA Doctoral Student Fellowships. She is a
licensed Certified Public Accountant with non-profit, public accounting, and industry experience.
Most recently, she was the financial controller for a subsidiary of a Fortune 100 company. She
received her undergraduate and master’s degrees in accounting from the McIntire School of
Commerce at the University of Virginia.
Dr. Harding’s professional affiliations include the KPMG PhD Project Accounting
Doctoral Student Association, AICPA, American Accounting Association, American Taxation
Association, National Tax Association, National Association of Black Accountants, and
Accounting and Financial Women’s Alliance. During her doctoral program, Michelle lived out
her commitment to service as one of the founders and the first president of the Multicultural
Graduate Student Organization, as a member of the Knoxville Area Urban League Young
Professionals and as a board member and volunteer for Girl Talk, Inc.
Dr. Harding is excited to begin her career as a tenure-track assistant professor in the
Department of Accounting & Information Systems at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University.

61

